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A main reason for the backlash against investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is that ISDS 
does not adequately guarantee the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. In particular, 
the fact that many arbitrators also act as legal counsel and represent both investors and states 
is perceived as problematic.  
To fix this (perceived) inadequacy, reforms must be pursued and enacted speedily. Various 
options exist. One extreme option would be to completely abolish ISDS and simply rely on 
domestic courts to resolve claims between foreign investors and states. This would be an 
undesirable option because, in many countries, the rule of law and the independence of the 
judiciary are compromised. Thus, a robust international legal infrastructure for ISDS remains 
necessary, though it should be simultaneously complemented by the strengthening of domestic 
legal systems.   
Recently, the EU Commission submitted to UNCITRAL’s Working Group III the basic outline 
of what a future Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) may look like.1 The MIC would be a 
standing two-tier dispute-settlement mechanism with full-time adjudicators. One of the most 
dramatic changes to the current ISDS system is that only states would select and appoint MIC 
judges, thus eliminating any participation of claimants which, so far, appoint one of the three 
arbitrators. Admittedly, states would not make the selection for specific disputes. However, 
states are invariably respondents in investor-state disputes, so the proposed system may raise 
concerns about the MIC’s independence and impartiality, including by affecting the principle 
of equality between the parties.  
It is therefore absolutely crucial that the MIC’s institutional design is very carefully considered 
and crafted. In particular, if a future MIC does not live up to the standards of independence and 
impartiality expected of a modern international court or tribunal, there is little point in even 
contemplating such a reform, as it is unlikely to fare any better than the current regime. 
How to guarantee independence and impartiality? 
  2 
Independence and impartiality are the cornerstone of a judicial system’s credibility. While 
judicial “independence” demands that judges make their decisions purely based on the law and 
the facts of a case, free from any external pressures, “impartiality” requires that judges are not 
objectively or subjectively biased in their decision-making in a particular case. Given the 
significance of judicial independence and impartiality to the success of any future MIC, this 
issue needs to be subjected to detailed discussion and deliberation in UNCITRAL’s Working 
Group III.  
To guarantee the MIC's institutional independence, the Court must possess operational 
(administrative and financial) independence, as well as decisional independence (decisions 
should be enforceable). To ensure the individual independence of MIC judges, judicial 
selection should be based on merit and undertaken transparently, and security of tenure should 
be ensured (non-renewable terms that are relatively lengthy promote individual independence). 
To implement a robust impartiality regime, a judicial code of conduct ought to be enacted, rules 
for recusal should be properly enshrined in law and a judicial complaints mechanism should 
be established. For any future MIC to be considered independent and impartial, it should thus 
possess at least the following features:2 
 An independent registry controlled by the court, administrative freedom on staffing 
matters and appropriate funding to ensure financial independence. 
 A scheme ensuring the enforceability of court decisions. 
 Implementation of non-renewable terms of judicial appointments that are 
approximately 7-9 years long, and other aspects guaranteeing financial security of 
judges.  
 Establishment of an independent panel or body of experts playing a substantive role in 
the judicial selection process that operates in a transparent way. 
 Implementation of a robust regime enhancing judicial impartiality. 
Clearly, creating a MIC is resource intensive, time consuming and a significant shift away from 
the current regime. If reform efforts are to be effective, guaranteeing judicial independence and 
impartiality should constitute key features of the proposed MIC. Ultimately, to address the 
legitimacy and credibility deficit of the current regime, the rule of law and the domestic 
judiciary in most countries must be strengthened. Otherwise, the reform will just amount to 
changing the label as opposed to bringing about real and meaningful reform.  
 
 
* The Columbia FDI Perspectives are a forum for public debate. The views expressed by the author(s) do 
not reflect the opinions of CCSI or Columbia University or our partners and supporters. Columbia FDI 
Perspectives (ISSN 2158-3579) is a peer-reviewed series. 
** Rishi Gulati (rishi.gulati@vicbar.com.au) is the LSE Fellow in Law at the London School of Economics and 
Barrister, Victorian Bar, Australia; Nikos Lavranos (n.lavranos@efila.org) is Secretary General of EFILA and 
Guest Professor, International Investment Law at the Brussels Diplomacy Academy of the Free University 
Brussels. The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the institutions with which the authors are 
affiliated.  The authors wish to thank Nathalie Bernasconi, Federico Ortino, and an anonymous reviewer for their 
helpful peer reviews.  
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2 Some of these features have already been incorporated into the EU proposal; see ibid., footnote 1, para. 19 
(security of tenure); para. 20 (qualifications); para. 22 (transparent appointment process); paras 30-32 (creating a 
self-standing enforcement mechanism); and paras 16-18 (ensuring provisions avoiding conflict of interest). 
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